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THE CREATION OF A MASS MOVEMENT: Strikes and Defiance,
1950-1952
by Tom Lodge
During the 1940's under the stimuli of industrial
action, communal protest and passive resistance and an
increasingly repressive social and political climate, the
African National Congress's leadership had reached the
point of embracing a strategy based on mass action : the
strikes, boycotts and civil disobedience entailed in the
Programme adopted in Bloemfontein in 1949. The form this
programme would assume was indefinite : the Programme p^
Action was a statement of principle rather than a detailed
strategem. But the months following the December conference
allowed little time for careful planning. In 1950 the Gov-
ernment began its first major offensive against organised
African opposition : the Suppression of Communism Act was
directed not solely at the Communist Party and left-wing
multiracial trade union groupings; it sanctioned the per-
secution of any individual group or doctrine intended to
bring "about any political, industrial, social or economic
change ... by the promotion of disturbance or disorder, by
unlawful acts" or "encouragement of feelings of hostility
between the European and non-European races of the Union."1
The Communist Party, its leadership already affected
by banning orders on J.B. Marks, Moses Kotane and Yusuf
Dadoo announced at a "defend free-speech convention" held
in Johannesburg on March 26th and presided over by Dr.
Moroka that May Day would be marked by a stay-away from
work in protest against the restrictions and low wages.
The May Day protest was not unanimously supported by the
ANC despite Moroka's presence at the convention. A Bantu
World columnist accurately summed up the feelings of many
Youth Leaguers including Mandela and Tambo when he commented
that the "People's Holiday" was "deliberately intended to
divert people from the Bloemfontein Programme".2 It cer-
tainly looked as if the Africanists had been upstaged as
there had been up to that point no evident attempt to im-
plement the Programme's call for "a national stoppage of
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work for one day as a mark of protest against the react-
ionary policy of the government."3 In fact the African
National Congress in the Transvaal appeared to be sharply
divided, the May Day protest being endorsed by Communists
who were also important Congress members (Bopape, Marks,
Thloome) and opposed in Johannesburg as well as Evaton and
the East Rand by Youth Leaguers.4
Despite disagreements between political leaders the
stay-away call evoked a significant response. Within the .
working class communities on the reef, experienced political
and trade union organisers of the calibre of Marks, Bopape,
and Thloome had at that stage probably greater local standing
than the young intellectuals of the Congress Youth League.
Nearly 2 000 police were put on duty in anticipation of the
event and in the course of clashes between police and crowds
in Alexandria, Sophiatown, Orlando and Benoni, eighteen
people were killed. Police and newspaper reports, describing
the events tell us very little about their real character.
We know something about some of the victims. Of the eleven
people who died, five were under the age of twenty-one,
three of them school-children, two were suffocated in a
cinema which had been set alight, one man was looking for
his child and another returning from work. Most of the
dead and wounded were under the age of thirty.5 But the
composition of the crowd and the motives of those who were
out on the streets that day are difficult questions to answer.
It is likely they varied in detail in each centre1. In Sophia-
town there was a well- established tradition of street viol-
ence spearheaded by gangsters. In Orlando, violence onlv
developed later in the day when police were escorting workers
home who had ignored the strike call. In Benoni, the police
were on the offensive, breaking up a large political meeting
with bayonets, then firing on the apparently infuriated crowd
which threatened to encircle them. While the conservative
Bantu World was inclined to view most of the violence as due
to the action of "groups of vicious youth"6 the stay-aways1
support from the working class population of Sophiatown and
the East Rand townships suggests that street actions did not
merely involve an anti-social minority. Loathing for the
police had a wide constituency - especially in the Western
Areas - for long the haven of those living on the edge of
legality. On the Rand, the period of 1948-1949 was marked
by a sudden tightening of the pass and liquor laws (and a
25% increase in conviction under them)7 which would have had
an especial impact in the "open" freehold locations such as
Alexandria, Sophiatoan and Benoni. It was not merely that
controls on mobility had tightened, they were also implemented
in an increasingly brutal fashion. From 1948 in Johannesburg,
there evolved a new blanket technique of police raiding, the
effect of which:
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"• "appears to be, not to trace and trap known
criminal gangs, but to conduct what resembles
a punitive expedition against the entire loca-
tion population-"s
These raids were to become especially frequent in the
early months of 1950 after protracted and bloody battles
betweed police and supporters of a municipal tram boycott
in the Western Areas. The tension of the crowds on the
Reef that May Day is best understood in the context of this
sudden intensification of official harrassment.
The May Day strike was succeeded by a series of dis-
cussions between nationalist and left-wing African leaders
culminating in a decision by the ANC National Executive to
call for a national stay-at-home in protest against the
shootings and the Unlawful Organisation Bill (subsequently
the Suppression of Communism Act). The "Day of Protest"
would be on June 26th. In the intervening period, in anti-
cipation of the Suppression of Communism Act, the Communist
Party dissolved itself. But much of its membership remained
politically active - in the case of its 1 500 African members
many already had positions within the ANC hierarchy.9 The
preliminaries to June 26th included discussions with Indian
Congress leaders who were to call out their own followers
that day. A committee to co-ordinate the activities of both
organisations was established with Walter Sisulu and Yusuf
Cachalia as joint secretaries. The Transvaal Youth League
issued a fiery statement supporting the protest and stirring-
ly concluding "Up you Mighty Race".10 Unlike the May protest,
June 26th could be viewed as unequivocably nationalist asser-
tion : the day itself (apparently chosen at random) had no
distracting working class or internationalist connotations.
The second 1951 stay-at-home was considerably more
decorous than the first. To avoid confrontations with the .
police, people were told to "remain quietly at home and think
seriously about the plight of their people."11 The most
noticeable effects of the Day of Protest were in Durban and
Port Elizabeth where even the hostile Bantu World admitted
there was a "most effective" stay-away by African workers.
On the Rand the organisers at the time were to claim in the
face of hostile press reports important successes, though
the ANC's National Executive report at the end of the year
conceded that response to the strike call in the Transvaal
was very poor.12 In Port Elizabeth, campaigning before the
stay-away centred as much around the Native Urban Areas
(Amendment) Bill as the impending restrictions on political
organisation. The amended Urban Areas Bill appeared espec-
ially threatening in Port Elizabeth, by 1950, the only major
urban centre exempt from the provision of influx control (see
below).l3
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In Port Elizabeth, the Communist Party had an adherence
both within the trade union movement and sections'of Congress
leadership. As we shall sae later> local developments in the
preceding decade had provoked the most extraordinary trans-
formation in a population which "had earned the reputation
for loyal behaviour in response to considerate municipal
policy."1" On Monday, June 26th, much of the unskilled lab-
our was withdrawn from industry and especially seriously af-
fected were the harbour, commerce and services which drew
most of their labour from the African population.15
In Durban where, because of the provincial presidency
of the aged ICU leader. Champion, political influence had
been linked with labour organisation, a bitter personal con-
flict between Champion and his provisional secretary, Selby
Msimang, had stimulated local Congress organisation. Champion
was later to complain of Msimang building" Congress branches
in every hostel and street-corner in Durban with a view to
organising factions hostile to me."16 Here, too, the Natal
Indian Congress as a result of the passive resistance move-
ment and the wartime development of working class conscious-
ness within the Indian population, had developed into a
radical mass movement. The Congresses were to claim a
60% abstention by the workforce, affecting 70 factories. Muni-
cipal workers were especially affected by victimisation dis-
missals, and the Council, despite its dismissal of 115 Afri-
can workers warned that in future it would discriminate
against Indian as opposed to African labour in its employment
policy - apparently the absenteeism rate was especially high
in the Indian workforce.17
The level of participation between different urban cen-
tres in these mass political demonstrations was beginning
to fall into a pattern which would characterise organized
Black opposition in urban centres for the rest of the decade.
We will be looking at the background to the outstanding fea-
ture of this pattern, that is the consistently strong respo-
nse to Congress campaigns in the Eastern Cape, as well as
variations elsewhere, later in this chapter. But a brief
digression is needed here to make a few points about the stay-
at-home tactic, which since 1950 has remained the most impor-
tant political weapon in Black protest politics The emer-
gence of the stay-at-home should be related to the realisa-
tion amongst Black politicians of the potential strength of
Black workers discussed in the last chapter. The Programme
of Action had called for a protest strike and this was to
characterise Congress's approach to the stay-away through-
out the decade. General withdrawals were intended as demon-
strations of strength; they were not in themselves direct
attacks on the power of the state or employers. Only in
isolated and localised instances would the stay-aways be
called for an indefinite period and assume the characteristic
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of a classical general strike. The organisation of the
stay-at-home took place mainly in the townships, through
open air meetings and door-to-door canvassing. South Afri-
can urban geography holds certain advantages for the organ-
isation of such protests : Black people are concentrated
in crowded and isolated housing complexes. Because of their
compact nature and few points of communication with the
rest of the city, mobilising or immobilising their inhabi-
tants is relatively easy. The township based stay-at-home
tactic had legal advantages as well : formal prohibitions
on African Industrial strikes were inadequate counter-
measures to the stay-aways. Organisation at the workplace
was considerably riskier, though it had advantages. When
Congress local leadership had strong links with trade unions
(as in Port Elizabeth) the stay-at-home would have the most
dramatic affect, worker solidarity being greater in the
factory than at home.
The stay-at-home appeared a useful and appropriate
means of protest. But it had disadvantages. As the events
in the 1950's were to demonstrate police action against
a township as opposed to a factory-based strike was consi-
derably simpler. Moreover, the stay-away left certain
workers untouched : when there were no controlled compounds
or hostels the effects of such strikes would be much more
widespread. Here again Port Elizabeth was exceptional.1 a
In the two years between the June 26th strike and the
first acts of civil disobedience in 1952, there was little
organised political activity outside the Western Cape. For
the African National Congress, nevertheless, they represen-
ted a crucial phase. The adoption of the Programme of
Action and the movement's involvement in political strikes
did not signify a thorough-going transformation from an
elitist to a popular movement. The period which followed
the Day of Protest was characterised by conflicts concerning
both strategic and ideological questions. The two main
issues were the position of the left within Congress and
the question of collaboration with non-African organisations
Until there was a degree of unanimity within Congress's
leadership over these , further implementation of the
Programme of Action would have to wait. Of the five mem-
bers of the "Council of Action" appointed in early 1950,
by the end of 1951, one had withdrawn from political acti-
vity and two had identified themselves with a dissenting
ANC faction, the National Minded bloc.
The Simons's remark, that with the dissolution of the
Communist Party on June 20th, 1950, and the absorption
thereafter of its activists in the affairs of Congress,
"the class struggle had merged with the struggle for
liberation11.19
The Creation of Mass Movement
This was precisely what Youth Leaguers had feared, with
their belief in the oppression of Africans "by virtue of
their colour as a race" 20 rather than through their position
as a class. Some Youth Leaguers were to join older conser-
vatives within the Transvaal Congress to oppose the success-
ful election of J.B. Marks as president of the provincial
organisation in November 1950. However, the most bitter
opposition to Marks came not from those who opposed "impor-
ted" ideologies and "obscure" influences but rather from
people who looked back with nostalgia to an era when poli-
tics was more socially exclusive:
"Congress wants a leader v/ith simple methods of
teaching the masses how to live; a man who has
himself proved a success in life as apparent from
their economic, social and political well-being."21
The similarities between the conservative and Youth
League opponents of Marks were superficial. Both stressed
race-pride in their popular appeal. But the former placed
their main emphasis on the virtues of African upward social
mobility22 - a major concern being opposition to Indian tra-
ding activity within Black residential areas. The latter
saw an ethnically derived nationalism as the key to mass
mobilisation. For a time the conservatives, banded together
as the "National Minded bloc" appeared.a serious threat.
In the first months of 1951, J.B. Marks and other Transvaal
leaders devoted much energy to establishing their authority
at public meetings, in the Johannesburg and Reef locations.
The Youth League was going through an important trans-
ition. Collaboration with other National Executive leaders
modified the Africanist position of Mandela and Tambo (the
older and less ideologically dogmatic Sisulu was a key
influence). Youth League spokesmen began to pay more atten-
tion to class based analyses. Dilizantabe Mji, president
of the Transvaal Congress Youth League from early 1951,
was a good example with his reference to:
"foaming racialist slogans that have perverted
the minds of their fellow white men ... driving
the white workers away from the ranks of the
toiling masses .. the ordinary white man must
be forgiven ... he is not an oppressor
the people never to be forgiven are those who
build round the lives of simple people this
facade of a Black peril."23
Mji's position was not shared by everyone - in 1952 his
re-election took place despite criticism of his "ideological
unreliability".21* In the early 195O1 s the League was to
divide into two camps : one was to promote in the words of
J.C. Matthews, "a healthy, democratic, non-racialist, anti-
colonial , anti-imperialist nationalism".2 5
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The other was to adhere to Africanist orthodoxy. "The
former camp was closer to the decision-making levels of
Congress. Its leaders tended to have greater professional
status and hence economic independence than the latter, manv
of whom were teachers, and hence less politically active.
For the time being, the Africanists were to content them-
selves by issuing ephemeral newsletters from their centres
in Orlando and East London.
African Communists were often ideologically rather ecle-
ctic and hence in 1950-1952 a more sensitive issue than their
presence in Congress's leadership was that of co-operation
with the Indian Congress.
. Anti-Indian sentiments were not confined to African busin-
essmen. In 1948, the Newclare Youth League passed a resolu-
tion calling on the Minister of the Interior to tighten
African/Indian residential segregation.ze In Behoni, in July
1952, Indian shopkeepers were attacked and their stores loo-
ted after one of their number had fatally beaten up an Afri-
can boy he suspected of stealing. 27 Conservative opponents
would often accuse the ANC leadership of being under control
of Indians. However, though co-operation between Indian and
African organisations would remain a sensitive issue in some
quarters, several factors by the beginning of the decade
made it considerably easier than before. First of all, like
the ANC, during the 1940's, the Indian Congresses in Natal
and the Transvaal became more popularly oriented. This
reflected the increase in the size of the Indian industrial
working class and its corollary, the spread of Indian trade
unionism, the development of a professional non-commercial
middle class, the spreading influence within these groups
of the South African Communist Party, and finally especially
in the Transvaal, the growing vulnerability of small retail-
ers threatened both by legislation and Afrikaner nationalist
trading boycotts.28 In 1946, in protest against the new
Asiatic Land Tenure Act, the Indian Congresses embarked on
a two-year campaign of civil disobedience in which over 2 000
volunteers were arrested, usually for illegal crossing of
provincial borders or the occupation of selected sites in
"white" areas of Durban. By the late 1940's, there seemed
less to be gained than before from isolating Indian struggles
from those of other Blacks, but in any case, the new Marxist
leaders of the Indian Congress for moral and ideological
reasons were eager to form links with other communal struggles.
This was achieved at a symbolical level with the "Joint
Declaration of Co-operation" signed by A.B. Xuma, ^ .M. Naicker,
and Yusuf Dadoo, which promised a combined struggle by
Africans and Indians against all forms of discrimination, as
well as by the participation of a small band of African volun-
teers in Germiston in one of the final acts of civil disobe-
dience .2 9
•..,•.: jii'Ai
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A more firm commitment to alliance with the Indian Congresses
by the end of the decade was stimulated by the Durban race
riots, which while doing nothing to improve everyday rela-
tionships between Africans and Indians, helped to persuade
leaders of both communities of. the dangers of their polari-
sation and the virtues of collaboration. The Defiance
Campaign itself would tangibly demonstrate the benefits of
communal co-operation; small traders apparently provided
an important financial contribution30 and newly independent
India's influence at the United Nations helped to attract
international attention to the campaign. ' Two other factors
served to bring the movements closer. In both the African
and Indian Congresses by the end of the decade, Marxists
had become influential at the level of leadership. In both,
the influence of well-established (and hence competitive)
groups of businessmen had lessened with the adoption of a
mass-based strategy. In the case of the Natal and Transvaal
Indian Congresses this came with the withdrawal in 194 6 of
the Indian High Commissioner in South Africa and hence the
end of the favoured tactic of the wealthy, lobbying.31 In
the case of the ANC, the formation of the National Minded
bloc in late 1950 was an important development. The bloc's
influence was greatly exaggerated by the Bantu World, the
editor of which, Selope Thema, was the bloc's president,
but its emergence was nevertheless significant for this
reason.
The above discussion helps to elucidate what were rather
dramatic developments given the racial isolationism of young
African politicians in previous years. The joint co-ordina-
ting committee which emerged during the June 26th stay-away
provided a precedent for the Council of Action's recommen-
dations, presented to the ANC National Executive on the after-
noon of a founding member's funeral, for a joint campaign with
Indian and Coloured organisations against pass paws and stock
limitation. On the 29th, 1951, a five man planning council
was established consisting of Moroka, Sisulu, Marks, Dadoo
and Yusuf. Cachalia. The Council's purpose was to establish
the appropriate strategy of mass resistance to six "unjust
laws". Helping to strengthen the conviction of some of
those who believed that conditions favoured a mass campaign
as well as contributing to the emergence of the Congress
Alliance were the events in the Western Cape where political
disaffection among Coloured people was becoming more militant
and assertive.
The radicalisation of Coloured politics began in the
1930's with the formation in Cape Town of the National Liber-
ation League and later the Non-European United Front under
the threat of segregationist legislation, which after demon-
strations and riots in District 6 was postponed. The 1939
congress of the NEUF was attended by representatives of the
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Cape ANC and the Communist Party.. Political organisation
within the Coloured community was to receive a further impe-
tus with the proposal in 1954 by Smuts to establish a
"Coloured Affairs Council." In response an Anti-CAD move-
ment was formed. Anti-CAD's main purpose was to deny any
legitimacy to segregationist political institutions, and this
with the fact that much of its following was among teachers
who were prescribed from activist politics, meant it's major
weapon was the electoral boycott. This was to create a
initial distance between it and both the Communist Party and.
the ANC, both of which, through the 194O1s made use of what-
ever political platform was available. The NEUM of which
the All African Convention and Anti-CAD were the two most
important affiliates was to gain a major following among
Coloured intellectuals, while the Communist Party succeeded
in bringing Coloured workers under its indirect influence
through a few well-organised trade unions.
By the end of the decade the relatively privileged-
position of the Coloured population in contrast to Africans
was being eroded. Between 1948 and 1951 prohibitions on
sexual relationships and marriage between Whites and Coloureds,
a humiliating system of racial classification under the
Population Registration Act, Cape peninsula train apartheid,
stricter residential segregation and the Separate Registration
of Voters' Bill appeared as new threats to Coloured security
and status.
Resistance to these measures was initially unpromisina.
When train apartheid was announced on August 13th, 1948, a
large meeting was convened by the Communist Party in front
of Cape Town's town hall. A Train Apartheid Resistance Com-
mittee was elected including Communists, Unity Movement
leaders, and members of the African Peoples Organization -
the oldest Coloured political organisation. Tensions within
this Committee swiftly developed. The United and APO people
were opposed to small-scale passive resistance.32 The
Communists accused the rest that their insistance on wide-
scale organisation as a precondition for resistance was mere-
ly an excuse for inactivity. 33 A call for 2OOO volunteers3 *
to fill Whites Only coaches attracted 300 who succeeded in
delaying^the departure of one Cape Town train for thirty
minutes.3.5 The Committee broke up shortly afterwards,
amid charges and countercharges of adventurism and cowardice.
However, by 1951 the focus of protest had shifted to
something rather more important than first-class Railway
Accommodation. In February, a conference was held, in
Cape Town attended by representatives of the African Peoples
Organisation, the South African Indian Congress, the ANC,
the local community groups and trade unions, to discuss the
opposition to the removal of Coloured voters from the common
roll. Out of this meeting grew the Franchise Action Committee.
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FRAC, as it was known, was a curious alliance involving both
left-wing trade unionists and some of the most accommoda-
tionist Coloured politicians including supporters of the
state-sponsored Coloured Advisory Council. Though the align-
ment of such diverse figures as Sam Kahn, one of the leading
figures in the Communist Party, and George Golding of the
National Convention, attracted the derision of the Unity
Movement, it was nevertheless quite effective in organising
well-supported protests. Speeches at FRAC meetings give some
idea of the tension and anxiety underlying these. As one
speaker pointed out:
"If you lose your votes you will become like the
African people. You will be placed in locations
you will be judged by Coloured Commissioners
if you lose your votes, you will lose every-
thing you have."36
In April, a FRAC conference resolved in favour of a
"political strike" which was eventually called for May 7th.
The strike affected Cape Town industry quite seriously
though Torch claimed, in many cases, that employers and
workers had prior agreements to work on a public holiday
instead. It was supported by both Coloured and African wor-
kers. At a conference in June 1951, 233 of the delegates
were from FRAC factory groups.37 Despite the amorphous nature
of its leadership FRAC had become an effective force among
working-class Coloureds who were most affected by new ™hite
worker protractionist policies. Coloured political volatism
was dramatised when a mainly Coloured crowd, responding to
the insurrectionary flavour of a Torch Commando demonstra-
tion began to converge on the House of Assembly only to be
violently repulsed by police.38
Though Coloureds were responding to the threat of losing
privileges which socially differentiated them from Africans,
nevertheless these events served to strengthen the argument
of those who advocated a multiracial campaign. The Joint
Planning Council reported in November 1951. The report recom-
mended that an ultimatum be presented to the Government to
repeal the "unjust laws" by the end of February. If the ulti-
matum was not met a campaign should begin either April 6th
(van Riebeeck's Day) or June 26th. The struggle would involve
the courting of arrests by trained volunteer corps of selected
laws and regulations. In the first stage, the campaign would
be limited to the major urban centres, in the second the num-
ber of corps and centres would increase, and finally the strug-
gle would "assume a general mass character" in both the town
and the countryside. In towns, ANC volunteers would defy the
pass laws and in the countryside people should be persuaded
to resist stock limitation. In the case of SAIC members,
provincial barriers, the Group Areas Act, apartheid regulat-
ions at railway stations, post offices and so forth would be
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the main targets. FRAC volunteers would also oppose the
Group Areas Act and apartheid regulations.39
The report also considered the possibility of strike
action but concluded that it should not be a major strategic
component until possibly later in the campaign. The report's
authors were concerned to make the campaign attract as wide
a range of participation as possible. Limiting it to various
forms of industrial action would, f.irst of all, miss the oppor^
tunity of involving, for example, the large number of people
affected by the Separate Registration of Voters Act who were
not industrial workers. The importance accorded to rural
action reflected the increasingly bitter struggle in the
reserves against Government rehabilitation schemes. In parti-
cular, the Witzieshoek disturbances of 1950-51 had helped
to draw the attention of African politicians to rural probl-
ems. The personal inclinations of the Council members would
have helped shape their recommendations. Moroka, himself,
as a country African doctor in Thaba Nchu, was considerably
more influenced by rural disaffection than his predecessor,
Xuma. Yusuf Cachalia was, of the five, the nearest to being
a Gandhist and both he and Dadoo brought to the Council
their own experiences in the 1946-1948 passive resistance
campaign. However, it was the former Africanist, Walter
Sisulu, who was the first to elaborate a civil disobedience
strategy.40 And notwithstanding the misgivings of some of
his colleagues, the campaign was not inconsistent with an
Africanist strategy; mobilisation was to be along communal
rather than class determined lines and only in exceptional
cases would "mixed" volunteer units be formed.
The underlying motives of the plan's authors and those
who adopted it are difficult to determine. The apparent
divisions in White politics (it was only in 1952 that the
Nationalist Party consolidated its control over the elec-
toral process) and the evidence of militantly expressed dis-
sent within the Black communities may have persuaded some
that civil disobedience would provide a strong enough chal-
lenge to change Government policy. Such considerations may
have helped to influence the choice of civil disobedience
which, while it challanged the moral authority of the law,
did so in a way which neither threatened nor seriously incon-
venienced the White population. It is unlikely that many
subscribed to Gandhi's notion of Satyagraha in which the
suffering of those punished for disobedience would activate
the inherent goodness of the rulers. More generally it was
hoped that the campaign would succeed in disorganising
authority bv filling to capacity the prisons and the courts.41
Some leaders saw the Defiance Campaign simply as a means of
enhancing the following of the nationalist movement.42
The Joint Planning Council report was endorsed in Decem-
ber by the delegates at the ANC's Annual Conference, over_
half of whom, according to Joe Matthews, were people "closely
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connected with the trade unions." "* 3 A National Action
Council composed of four ANC and three SAIC leaders was set
up to direct campaigning. The only expression of dissent
was from the Natal Provincial organisation. This was now
led by Chief Albert Lutuli, after a bitter struggle between
the old incumbent, A.W. Champion, and the Youth League. For
various reasons. Congress was in disarray in Natal and Lutuli
and other delegates doubted the organisation had the capacity
to mount a mass struggle in that province. The provincial
secretary, Selby Msimang, in the following month was to
publicly condemn the joint African/Indian leadership of the
campaign as being especially inappropriate in the Natal
context of communal tensions.1*11
In January, 1952, an ultimatum signed by Dr. Moroka and
Walter Sisulu, calling for the repeal of six "unjust laws"
was sent to the Prime Minister. The laws singled out were
in themselves a telling reflection of the additional pressures
Black people had been subjected to since 1948. First there
were the Pass Laws, a longstanding grievance, but recently
enforced with new vigour. Stock limitation and the Bantu
Authorities Act were fiercely contested attempts by the state
to restructure the local economies and politics in the reserves
The Group Areas Act imposed a national uniformity in resi-
dential and occupational segregation and in particular,
threatened those who owned property or operated a business
in a "white" area (though it threatened many other groups
as well). Included in the six laws were two affecting
political rights : the Voters Representation Act and the
Suppression of Communism Act. To nobody's surprise the
ultimatum was rejected in a letter from the Prime Minister's
secretary.
On May 31st, encouraged by the success of huge rallies
organised on April 6th in protest against the van Riebeeck
tercentenary celebrations, the ANC, SAIC, and FRAC executives
decided the Defiance Campaign would begin on June 26th. The
Campaign was to be the most sustained and in terms of number
of participants the most successful organised resistance the
ANC was ever to initiate. Because much of the scholarly anal-
ysis on Congress campaigns emphasises bureaucratic inadequa-
cies as the key to understanding their shortcomings, it is
worth looking at the state of Congress organization at the
inception of the campaign. For judged by narrow bureaucratic
criteria the ANC was in no state to organise a major campaign.
Its 1951 executive report mentioned financial crisis and the
difficulties caused by Natal and Transvaal leadership disputes.
The organisation could afford only one full-time paid official,
Walter Sisulu. Though membership was on the increase (7 000
on the eve of the campaign) it was concentrated in a small
number of active branches : 25 in the Transvaal, 14 in the
Cape, 17 in a Free State, and an unspecified number in Natal.1*5
A plan to break the provincial organization into less cumber-
some and geographically more logical units had only just
begun to be implemented.he
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Clearly if the campaign was to be successful it would have
to rely on informal channels of communication and local ini-
tiative.
Despite these difficulties the campaign's programme
was remarkably consistent with the JPC recommendations. It
opened in the main urban centres on the Reef and Port Eliza-
beth on June 26th. In Boksburg, 50 people, led by the
veteran passive resister, Nana Sita, walked through the
gates of the African location without the appropriate permits
and were arrested. That night 52 men, including Mandela and
Cachalia, broke the curfew laws in central Johannesburg. In
Port Elizabeth, thirty walked through the "Europeans Only"
entrance of the New Brighton Railway Station. The day after-
wards, nine volunteers opened the campaign in the Western
Cape, standing at the white counter of Worcester Post Office.
Worcester was a small town, but a logical starting point for
the Western Cape resistance, being an important centre for
the canning industry and hence the centre of activity for one
of the largest and most militant Black, trade union organisa-
tions, the Food and Canning Workers1 Union and its African
sister union. The opening actions set the pattern for the
campaign : until the police actually tried to prevent acts
of defiance they were warned well in advance so thev could
be present. Volunteer groups remained small and easily
manageable. Their defiance was watched by a much larger
crowd of supporters and was often preceded by meetings and
street processions. The regulations disobeyed were very minor
ones : use of white facilities at Post Offices, Railway
Stations and on trains, the breaching of curfew regulations,
and other pass laws, and entering African locations without a
permit. Despite the imposition of increasingly heavy sen-
tences by magistrates (including flogging for young people)
almost without exception volunteers opted to serve prison
sentences which could last two or three months rather than
pay the alternative fine.
Infusing the resistance, especially in the Eastern Cape but
elsewhere as well, was a mood of religious fervour. The cam-
paign opened and was accompanied by "days of prayer", volun-
teers pledged themselves at praver meetings, to a code of
cleanliness, love and discipline. Manyanos wore their uni-
forms and accompanied Congress speeches with solemn hymn
singing, and even at its tense climax in Port Eliaabeth,
despite the syndicalist undercurrent of a political strike
call people were enjoined on the strike's first day to:
"conduct a prayer and a fast in which each member
of the family will have to be at home."1*7
Thereafter they were to attend nightly church services.
A few Congress spokesmen, especially in Johannesburg, where
the Youth League provided an important leadership component
spoke in the strident idiom of Africanism :
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"To you who are young and whose blood is hot, we say catch
the bull by its horns, Afrika".1*8 But more typically the
verbal imagery of the campaign involved ideas of sacrifice,
martyrdom, the triumph of justice and truth. J.B. Marks'
speech made in anticipation of his arrest for breaking a
banning order just before the campaign opened set the tone
for much of what was to follow. Referring to the ANC as the
real Noah's Ark he went on to announce: "This is the hour
now.. I am being crucified and I feel the weight of the
cross" . **9
By the beginning of August, the campaign had spread from
its oriqinal centres to East London, Uitenhage, the West Rand,
and Vereeniging, Pretoria, Grahamstown, and Cape Town.
Already it was apparent that the most dramatic levels of par-
ticipation were in the Eastern Cape towns. One one early
morning in August, for example, between 12.01 a.m. and 8.15
a.m., eleven groups broke Railway apartheid regulations at
New Brighton and« the Main City stations with 245 volunteers,
being arrested.50. There were other regional variations as
well. The pattern on the Rand was for groups to travel out
from a main Congress centre and break the law in an outlying
township. Consequently location permit requirments were the
regulation most frequently broken by the Transvaal defiance..
In the East Cape, on the other hand, much more dependence
was placed on local initiative: people were encouraged to
defy in their home areas.
The campaign reached its peak in September, 2,500 resisters
being arrested that month in 24 centres which included both
Bloemfontein and Durban. It received a fresh impetus at the
beainnina of October when India successfully moved that South
Africa should become the centre of a UN General Assembly debate
The campaign leaders, most of them now facing charges under the
Suppression of Communism Act, called for a broadening of the
campaign in response. By October it had drawn volunteers in
everv manor town in the union and in addition had attracted
some rural support: most dramatically in Peddie in the Ciskei,
but also from 31 Eastern Transvaal farm workers who had been
organised in a farm workers' union by the ANC leader, Gert
Sibande, since the late 1930s. In the Eastern Cape the
campaign had appeared, to have reached the first stage
projected by the Joint Planning Council. By mid-October nearly
2,000 had volunteered. They had on several occasions managed
to fill to capacity the city's smart new jail, and police
re-inforcements had to be drafted in from other parts of the
country.51 The more generalised resistance envisaqed in the
projected stage of the campaign appeared to be taking place
in the Eastern province: in Peddie several hundred people were
under arrest for breaking curfew regulations and there were
reports of especially wide hostilities and lack of co-opera-
tion with cattle-dipping measures. In Port Elizabeth, from
quite early on, despite injunctions by a section of the ANC
leadership, strike action was combined with civil disobedience.
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Volunteers returning to work, having served their prison
sentences, would be refused re-employment. Workers with
the encouragement of ANC activists, would then empty the
factories. In three weeks six strikes involving 850 workers
took place.bi
Between October 18th and November 9th, the campaign
virtually ground to a halt there being less then 300 arrests
thereafter. In its two main centres, where in anv case,
resistance seemed to be losing its momentum, the movement
was paralysed by events surrounding the outbreak of rioting,
on October 18th in Port Elizabeth and on November 9th in
East London. The riots will be discussed later. They
essentially arose out of the increasingly tense relationship
between Blacks and police the campaign had generated. The
Port Elizabeth riots were succeeded by bans and curfews,
which quite apart from the inhibiting affects of the violence
and deaths which occurred in the riots, made political acti-
vity very difficult. In reaction to both the police's and
the City Council's actions, Port Elizabeth Congress leader-
ship called for a workers' stay-at-home which, like the bus
boycott which had followed the introduction of armed police
on Railway buses after the riots, enjoyed almost total sup-
port from the African workforce and was backed by many Colo-
ured workers as well. Left-wing activists had wanted the
strike to be indefinite, but they were overruled. The
strike was limited to a one-day demonstration. Its success
appeared to have set the pattern for future development of
the campaign. By February, rank and file feeling at both
the Cape and Transvaal provincial conferences were in favour
of continued "industrial action". This was prompted, by two
recently enacted laws, the Public Safety Act (enabling the
Government to declare a state of emergency) and the Criminal
Law Amendment Act which set the seal on any further civil
disobedience efforts by imposing a three-year imprisonment
and/or flogging on any violation of the law "bv way of pro-
test against the law". The strike call, though accepted in
principle by the Congress National Executive, was never to
be implemented. In 1953 bans on political leaders and organi'
sational confusion caused in part by the immense expansion
of the movement as a result of the campaign served to immo-
bilise resistance.
Out of this necessarily cryptic account53 of the cam-
paign several questions arise which the rest of this chapter
will attempt to answer. These are: How does one account
for the extraordinary response in the Eastern Cape? What was
the connection between the campaign and the riots? Why was
participation in the campaign in Natal so limited (300 arrests
and none outside Durban)? What were the achievements of the
campaign? We will begin by considering the background to
events in the Eastern Cape.
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A variety of factors said to have existed in the Eastern
Cape in a unique combination are usuallv put forward to explain
the strength of Conqress's following there during the 19 50s.
These include the ethnic homogeneity of the local population;
the deep historical roots of modern political culture; the
more relaxed legal environment - the absence in Port Elizabeth
of influx control; the greater sense of deprivation as the
Eastern Cape affcer 1948 was brought into conformity with the
harsher segregationist policies of the north; the persistence
of attitudes generated during a bloody phase of primary
conflict; the strength of trade unionists and the existence
of a large concentration of industrial Africans in Port
Elizabeth; the stability of family life; the extent of con-
version to Christianity; the lack of divisive Communist
influence in African politics.54 However, such hypotheses
need testing in a more detailed examination of their local
context if they are to provide a convincing explanation.
With the exception of ethnic homogeneity most of these
factors would have been operative in the Rand where a major
proportion of the African population had several generations
acquaintance with "modern" political activity, trade unionism
and Christianity, and where important centres had only recently
been subjected to the full rigours of influx control under
the Urban Areas Act.55 There is little evidence that ethnic
or linguistic differences either within the African community
or between Africans and Indians inhibited political response
in the Transvaal. Only a detailed consideration of the
Eastern Cape political environment and local antecedents of the
campaign can provide an understanding of its course in this
area- Therefore, let us look at its two major centres, Port
Elizabeth and East London.
Port Elizabeth is one of South Africa's oldest industrial
centres, the town's prosperity being initially b*se^ on its
importance as a port as well as the local leather industry.
In the 1920s it was the obvious site for South Africa's
fledgeling motor industry - both its port facilities and its
central position between major population connurbations made
it the logical choice. In 1923 work began on the Ford
assembly line. The major behicle manufacturers were followed
by components industries as well as clothing and food
processing factories.. By the 1930s Port Elizabeth's popula-
tion was the most rapidly increasing in South Africa. The
Second World War halted the rate of industrial expansion
though it stimulated the existing factories to diversify their
output. The late 1940s, however, was a period of unprecedented
industrial growth with the establishment of two tyre factories,
a Ford and a Volkswagen plant, stainless steel, canning,
metallurgic and electronics concerns and manv others.57
Much of the initial industrial activity was to depend on
White and Coloured labour and it was only the late 1930s and
1940s that Africans began to be drawn into manufacturing in
large numbers. Nevertheless for a long time Port Elizabeth
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had been an important centre of African employment: an official
brochure in 1937 was to include the availability of an
"inexhaustible" supply of cheap labour as one of the city's
main attractions.58
In 1951 over 60,000 Africans lived in Port Elizabeth.59
This population was structured in the following way. Just
half of it was female: unusual in the context of South Africa's
urban black population, which was usually preponderantly male
because of the migrant labour system. Unfortunately the 1951
census figures do not include occupational statistics. We
know that in 1946 when the population was 42,000, less than
3,000 were employed in manufacturing - about 21% of the work-
force. Approximately 2,250 were involved in commerce and
another 2,000 in transport, mainly as dockers and railway
workers. The rest worked in service industries and as
domestics.60 Expressed as a proportion of the working
population, the proportion involved in manufacturing was not
especially high: it was much higher for example in many towns
of comparable size on the Rand - Roodepoort, a politically
quiescent town in the 1950s would be a case in point. It was
also, in contrast to the Rand, fairly recently involved -
many of Port Elizabeth's key industries up to the war had
drawn their labour principally from Whites and Coloureds.
What is more significant however than the size or experience
of the African industrial population was the relative ease,
compared to other centres, of organising it. There were
fewer internal linguistic barriers than in other towns: 95%
of Port Elizabeth's African population spoke Xhosa and possibly
more important, none lived in the controlled environment of
hostels, compounds or barracks. This made Port Elizabeth,
with East London, among large South African towns, unique.
Most workers in Port Elizabeth lived with their families in
the various townships and locations. A final demographic feature
of the population was that it was increasing rapidly - in the
fifteen years between 1936 and 1951 it more than doubled
though this was a contemporary characteristic of many other
urban Black populations in South Africa. And despite this
expansion (and this was unusual) because of industrial growth,
unemployment could not have been a major problem - city
councillors, as late as 1948, were complaininq of difficulties
in obtaining domestic servants because of the local aversion
to this type of work.61
Port Elizabeth's Black population originally lived in
five inner-city locations demolished at the beginning of the
century on the insistence of the Plague Board. The inhabi-
tants of these slums trekked over the municipal boundary to
Korsten which by the 1930s was a huge over-crowded, rack-
rented, shanty village - a place arousing considerable official
disapproval, because of its overcrowding, consequent disease,
a high crime rate and the effects of all these on surrounding
suburbs. In the late 1930s with the aid of a state loan
work began, five miles from the city centre, on the huge
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municipal housing complex of New Brighton. The 9,000
African inhabitants of Korsten (where the poor of all races
lived) hegan to be evicted and expropriated and rehoused in
the new township.63 By 1941 New Brighton had a population
of 20,000 living in tidy rows of bungalows. However,
Korsten's African population was still 8,000 as people
continued to pour into the town seeking work. Another 4,000
lived on employers' premises.64 Building continued in New
Brighton: by the end of the war it accommodated 35,000.65
In contrast to municipal townships elsewhere, New Brighton's
population lived with relative freedom from official restric-
tions: there was no curfew, no pass regulation, no registra-
tion of employment and even domestic brewing was allowed.66
Not surprisingly, because of these freedoms, the city had the
lowest Black crime statistics in the country.67 Port Eliza-
beth's industrial employers favoured a relatively skilled
workforce with a low rate of turnover and this was what the
city fathers were efficiently providing.
During the late 1940s, municipal policy began to change.
In Port Elizabeth's hinterland, other towns nearer the
African reserves, began to close themselves off from a rural
population hit by an increasing degree of land shortages and
a savage series of droughts. The number of desperate men and
women seeking shelter and work in Port Elizabeth grew laraer
as opportunities elsewhere shrank. By 1948, Korsten's
African population was bigger than it had been ever before,
many of its inhabitants rentinq out miserable rooms construc-
ted from packing cases in which motor-car parts had arrived.
Such dwellings were being built at a rate of 60 a month,
with one 9' x 7' room housinq as manv as thirteen people.69
The problem worsened as farmers begany to evict squatters and
workers' dependants from their land..70' The Council attempted
to check this growth by sudden demolition orders but this
achieved only more overcrowding. More effective were the
terrible fires, weekly occurrences which could destroy
hundreds of shelters at a time. In 1946, a local survey
showed Port Elizabeth to haxze out of six major centres, the
poorest African population..71" By 1949, it was reckoned that
Port Elizabeth shared with East London the worst tuberculosis
rate in the world..? Within the Council liberalism began to
appear anachronistic. In 1949, "foreign" (non-Cape Province)
Africans were told to register with the municipality if they
wanted to remain in Port Elizabeth.73 At the end of 1950
such controls were being seriously contemplated for the
"local" African population.74 And in early 1952 a labour
bureau was established by the City Council. Work seekers
were no lonqer allowed to remain in Port Elizabeth for an
unlimited period.75
To summarise: in 1952 Port Elizabeth's Black population,
despite municipal paternalism, was almost universally poor
and frequently ill-housed. Relatively few had directly
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benefited from the city's industrial boom, most being employed
in the tertiary sector. A large proportion had recently esc-
aped from the desperate poverty which characterised much
of the rural hinterland of the Eastern Cape {see below). They
did have certain freedoms, compared to Africans elsewhere
and these were to be crucial in determining their response to
local conditions. But in 1952 it was clear that existing
freedoms would shortly be eroded.
Local concerns apart, to understand popular responses of
the early 1950's, one should keep in mind the general politi-
cal climate of the 1940's, a decade of dramatically shifting
political expectations. This was reflected in, perhaps a
little exaggeratedly, a series of trials involving officials
of an "African Legion." The Legion was led by a self-styled
"Prince of Abyssinia". He and his "Knights of the Grand
Cross" had toured Port Elizabeth and East London locations
at the beginning of the war, warning of a coming catastrophe
and raising money to build an army which would with the aid
of the Japanese overthrow the Europeans. People were encou-
raged to buy "trademarks" of a firm "Prince Yusuf" claimed
to represent.76
Fortunately, charlatans and dreamers did not predominate
in the efforts to organise Port Elizabeth's Africans. With
the wartime expansion of the African industrial workforce
came the first serious efforts at trade unionism since the
collapse of the ICU fifteen years before. The initial organ-
isation was done by A.Z. Tshiwula, a protege of the Friends
of Africa.77 Tshiwula's approach was hardly militant : in
1945 W.G. Ballinger had to chide him for signing a letter
to the Railway Systems Manager as "your obedient servant".78
However, he was responsible for establishing two years earlier
the first union for Port Elizabeth's African Railway workers.
In 1941 in a second liberal trade union initiative, the
Institute of Race Relations sent a Trotskyite. Max Gordon,
to Port Elizabeth. Unlike Tshiwula, Gordon had the support
of the local Trades Council and was able, during his short
visit, to organise seven unions among cement, soft drinks,
food and canning, engineering, leather and distributive
workers.79 It was these unions which were to provide the
backbone of industrial struggle in the 1940's. During the
war, they were to be taken over by officials who were members
of the local Communist Party branch.80 The Communists were
also successful in reducing the influence of Tshiwula among
Railway Workers, by 1944 the latter had to content himself
with leading a white collar staff association.81 The follow-
ing year Tshiwula's opponents were active amongst domestic
workers.82 In 1945 the nineteen Port Elizabeth affiliates
of CNETU claimed a membership of 30 000.83 This was obviously
an inflated figure given the size of Port Elizabeth's work-
force, but obviously the extent of trade unionism amongst
Port Elizabeth's African workers was unusually great.
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The strength of trade union consciousness in Port Eliza-
beth was evident in the laundry workers' strike in April 1948
when 200 blacks walked out of city laundries after 2/6d. week-
ly pay increase had been refused. During the strike, which
lasted a month, the six dry-cleaning and laundry establish-
ments affected, were picketed by large crowds, delivery vans
were stoned and set alight, blacklegs and police fiercely at-
tacked in pitched street battles. Thirteen strike leaders,
some of them Communists, were arrested under the Riotous Assem-
blies Act though charges were later dropped when the strike
was legalised by the Department of Labour. Trades and Labour
Council support was crucial to workers' resistance : all
strikers received a weekly strike pay. Large, mass meetings
were arranged by the New Brighton Communist Group to publicise
the strikers' demands and win communal support.81*
A vital characteristic of organised popular resistance
in Port Elizabeth was the inter-penetration of the trade uni-
ons and political movements of those years.85 Both Communist
Party, and more untypically for the 1940's, ANC office holders
were trade unionists. Raymond Mhlaba, a laundry worker until
his dismissal after the 1948 strike, was secretary of the local
Communist Party branch and ANC chairman in Port Elizabeth from
1947 to 1953. A.P. Mati, organiser of Railway and distribu-
tive workers was also a member of the Communist Party district
committee and an ANC branch chairman in .the 1940*3. Caleb
Mayekiso, president of the local textile workers1 union, was
to become an important ANC leader in the early 1950's. Glad-
stone Tshume, who led the 1946 dock workers' strike, was
another important ANC leader as well as the Communist Party
candidate in the 1948 Advisory Board elections. Frances
Baard was secretary of both the Food and Canning Workers'
union and the ANC Womens1 League. There is no need to go on-
while Congress in other centres was led by a professional
elite, in Port Elizabeth because of the relative strength of
trade unionism, working class leaders dominated African poli-
tics. Nor was their position under serious challenge from
Youth Leaguers. In the Cape, Youth League organisations began
in late 1948 with the establishment of a branch at Fort Hare.86
One year later a branch was formed in New Brighton, but in
June 1950 its membership was still very small.87 The Youth
League tended to draw its membership from young professionals:
university students, teachers, lawyers and articled clerks
and doctors. Such a group was small enough in Johannesburg,
in Port Elizabeth it was infinitisimal : excluding soldiers,
the 200 or so members of Port Elizabeth's African "professional"
class listed in the 1946 census was mainly composed of teachers,
policemen and priests. The city had one African doctor, did
not have a university/ and there were no Black lawyers, or
legal workers. For its size, the town also had a very small
number of African traders (half the number of East London,
a smaller town).
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In this context the popular orientation of local political
leadership was understandable.
Of the local Youth Leaguers only one was to play a really
prominent role in Eastern Cape politics. This was James
Njongwe, one of the first medical graduates of the University
of the Witwatersrand, Dr Njongwe joined the Youth League in
Johannesburg and served on its National Executive before
returning to the Eastern Cape to open his practice in New
Brighton in 1947. Njongwe was already a politician of some
stature and he immediately assumed a leading role in the
local affairs of Congress. A gifted speaker and brilliant
organiser, to him and Robert M.atji, the branch secretary,
belong much of the credit for establishing the basis of a
local mass organisation.
In Port Elizabeth popular political participation was an
established tradition by 1952. In contrast to other centres
local leaders had successfully bridged the gap which existed
elsewhere between direct community action ("the politics
of the poor") and more self-conscious organised forms of
protest. They helped to set a particular local style: the
crowded meetings, and massed street processions through the
city centre which developed during the 1945-47 rent and food
shortage protest: the preference for direct action as opposed
to lobbying and negotiation. This was partly a consequence
of the municipal political climate. Because the authorities
were themselves reputedly liberal there were fewer inter-
mediaries between them and the crowds. The militancy of local
leadership was demonstrated especially in the 1949 bus boycott,
itself the curtain raising act of the drama which was to
develop in following years.
The Port Elizabeth bus boycott lasted nearly four months,
from April 19th to the first week in August. Transport
between New Brighton and the city was controlled by South
African Railways which operated both a train and a bus service.
On April 1st without warning, the 3d fare was raised to 4d.
In the month before the boycott, the New Brighton Advisory
Board had been informed it could expect a general 7i% increase
in South African Railway fares, and the disproportion between
this and the one third rise in bus fares appeared extremely
unjust. The fare rise, which represented an extra 4 shillings
a month for every commuter in the household came at a time
when the real value of household incomes were dropping: school
attendance in New Brighton was reported to have sharply fallen
in 1949 because parents could not afford clothes or school
fees for their children. As well as the fare rise there were
other longstanding grievances voiced by the people who
attended a mass meeting on Sunday 17th April in the township.
The bus service was erratic and unreliable: passengers had
sometimes to wait for two hours after work before boarding a
bus to take them home and unsheltered bus queues could stretch
half a mile away from the bus terminus in the city. Not
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content with being inefficient, bus drivers and conductors
were also arrogant and abusive, departing from the scheduled
route when it pleased them to do so, driving off with only
half their complement of passengers, and on occasions depositing
them outside the police station where they would be subjected
to humiliating searches. The buses themselves had become
less convenient: the older models had plenty of space for
parcels but these were being replaced with vehicles with no
room for luggage. This was especially annoying for the
large number of female food vendors who travelled into town
each day to sell their wares to workers during the lunch hour.
The meeting resolved to mount a boycott of buses on
Tuesday 19th April (the 18th was Easter Monday which gave
plenty of time to publicise the boycott). The meeting also
elected an Action Committee which consisted of twenty eight
people. The Committee was led by Raymond Mhlaba and its
membership included a large contingent of left-wing Conqress-
men, as well as James Njongwe and W.M. Tsotsi, the president
of the All African Convention. On the 19th the SAR buses
travelled to and from the township empty and 15,000 people
used alternative transport to work. Many went on the trains
but several thousand were to make use of the services provided
by entrepreneurially minded vehicle owners in the township.
At first a free lift service was run by white (?) sympathisers.
Meanwhile the Committee telegrammed A.B. Xuma and the
parliamentary Native Representatives requesting them to make
representations on their behalf. Mrs Ballinger did suceed
in gaining an interview with the Minister of Transport who,
claiming that SAR made a loss of £20,000 a year, implied
that the Ministry would welcome a takeover of the route by
private enterprise.
Thereafter the boycott committee was to canvass the idea
of an African initiative in this direction and many of the
speeches at subjsequent meetings contained a strong theme of
economic nationalism. As it turned out nobody within New
Brighton appeared to have the capital resources for such a
venture and negotiations with the rural King Williamstown-
based Organised Bantu Partnership Bus Service were unfruitful.
On May 8th a mass meeting resolved to organise a train boy-
cott calling on people to walk to work on the 16th and on the
Chamber of Commerce to refrain from victimising late comers.
This seemed to jolt the local authorities into responding:
in the week between the meeting and the proposed train boycott
members of the Action Committee met Council officials and
began discussing the possibility of the municipal Tramway
Company taking over the route. Meanwhile the bus boycott
continued, though by the beginning of June it required fairly
energetic picketing to enforce it and many people were being
picked up by the Railway buses outside the borders of the
township and hence away from the pickets. However later that
month the boycott received an extra fillip when the Cape ANC
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held its provincial congress in New Brighton and national
leaders of the standing of A.B. Xuma and Z.K. Matthews spoke
at a mass meeting in support of the boycott.
At the end of the month the Action Committee announced
the boycott was suspended pending the outcome of negotiations
between the Committee and the Transport Committee, then
holding its hearings in Port Elizabeth. The Commission
recommended a subsidy scheme in which the Municipality and
private employers should reimburse the transport operator,
according to the number of their employees, with the loss
that pegging fares at 3d would incur. Infuriatingly it is
at this point that the press reportage ceases: presumably
the boycott ended (despite a popular sentiment that employers
should subsidize all buses, not just one company, thus
allowing African operators to compete). The only other
shred of information we have is a letter written to the left
wing pro-Congress newspaper. Advance, in 1954 by G.X. Tshume
describing the takeover of Port Elizabeth's African transport
from the SAR by the Bay Transport Bus service. For the first
time there would be African bus drivers and conductors, and
this was seen as a tremendous victory, the news being greeted
with shouts of 'Mayebuye' at joyful township meetings.
Tshume, a member of the 1949 Action Committee, traces this
achievement back to the 1949 struggle, 'which failed to bring
immediate results1.89 So it would appear that the people of
New Brighton had a long wait before they could savour the
taste of victory.90
The development of the Defiance Campaign in Port Elizabeth
reflected this rich heritage of protest. The strategic
formulations of the Joint Planning Council were reinterpreted
in the light of local traditions. This was evident, for
example, in the series of lightning strikes which developed
after employers had refused to reinstate volunteers. At a
New Brighton meeting in July, one G. Simpe, told his audience
they "could force an election tomorrow if they stayed away
from work for thirty days". Dr Njongwe opposed such moves,
criticising those who wished to drag "side issues . . . into
the defiance of unjust laws campaign".91 Njongwe, who
during the campaign presided over the Cape ANC in the absence
of Professor Z.K. Matthews, was also to find himself at odds
with the local branch leadership over the question of the
duration of the November stay-at-home. The strike was
originally called in Njongwe's absence by the local leaders,
and was intended to continue until "God Almighty has changed
the hearts of the City Councillors" who had just imposed a
curfew and ban on meetings.92 The strike call was enthusias-
tically accepted at a series of open-air meetings in New
Brighton, Korsten, Veeplats and Walmer held on Sunday,
November 2. Njongwe, however, succeeded in re-asserting his
authority on his return. The stay-away lasted only a day.
He owed his success to the outcome of negotiations with the
mayor who, in return for a token strike, promised the
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reduction of the curfew to three months and lifting of the
meetings ban after a month.93 But the Council's conciliation
was only tactical: in January 1953 it decided the city would
be proclaimed under the Urban Areas Act thus enabling the
Native Commissioner to "weed out the tsotsi, vagrant and
'won't work1 element".94
Njongwe, however, was not insensitive to the particular
dynamics of local politics. Advising the Durban defiance
leaders he recommended that:
resisters should also start defiance at
their own places and not come to Durban
to defy away from home ... the spiritual
aspect of the resistance movement must be
exploited. Whenever resisters go into
action they must first go to church for
prayer and dedication.
This strategy was followed in the Eastern Cape where branches
tended to act autonomously of any central direction acting
on a well-established pattern of popular political involve-
ment. This contrasted with the more structured and centralised
organisation attempted in the Transvaal.*
To recapitulate: the Defiance Campaign succeeded in
arousing massive support in Port Elizabeth for the following
reasons. Swift expansion of its African population in the
1940s introduced socio-economic tensions which were beyond
the capacity of a paternalistic local administration to
alleviate. Industrialists who were the powerful voice in the
local economy favoured an urbanised workforce and a floating
pool of labour. Great poverty, comparatively few restrictions
and a sizeable African industrial workforce led to the
development of a powerful African trade union movement which
deliberately concerned itself with issues well outside the
scope of conventional economistic trade unionism. By 1950
politics was in the hands of working class leaders to an
extent which distinguished Port Elizabeth from any other
centre. With increasing restrictions on African mobility
being imposed elsewhere in the Cape, Port Elizabeth in the
last years before the campaign became more crowded and life
more intolerable. In 19 52, there appeared the new threat of
municipal influx control. Drawing on a well-established
local tradtion of mass protest, the African community was
able to link parochial concerns with more general political
ideas: popular politics transcended the normal subsistence
anxieties which predominated in everyday life.
We will return to Port Elizabeth in a moment to consider
the riots. East London shared some of Port Elizabeth's
characteristics, being a port with an industrial sector
which had grown quickly during the war recruting African
labour to replace whites involved in the war effort. In
common with Port Elizabeth, there were no compounds or
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hostels. Demographically the African population displayed
similarities: an even ratio between the sexes, linguistic
homogeneity and so on. But in some respects the towns were
very different. In East London attempts to strictly enforce
influx control dated from the early 1930s. The majority of
workers in East London returned every weekend to the Ciskei
to visit their families. The municipal authorities construc-
ted no housing at all between 1926 and 1940, and when money
became available after the city's proclamation under the
Urban Areas Act, progress on the first sub-economic scheme
of Duncan village was so slow that in the main location,
four-fifths of the population lived in privately constructed
wood and iron shacks.
As we have said, despite the balance between the sexes,
East London's African population was largely one which oscilla-
ted between working in the town and visiting their families
over weekends. Eighty-six percent of the population was
rural born,97 and surveys made in the early 1950s indicated
that the majority of men between the ages of 30 and 50 spent
several years of their adult lives as peasants before coming
to East London.98 Philip Meyer found in 1955 that just less
than half the male working population could be categorised
as "Red": that is having a preference for traditional clothing
and ancestor beliefs as opposed to Christianity. In East
London, then, a large proportion of the population was
strongly influenced by an indigenous rural culture and more
still maintained family links with the countryside. Christ-
ianity and schooling, not surprisingly, would affect political
and social aspirations. Meyer's survey found with "Red"
workers, a detached attitude to white South African culture
prevalent: "I like nothing about the white man being quite
satisfied with what I am myself". Among "school" people an
assertion of ommon cultural identity combined with resent-
ment at white social exclusiveness was more common..9^
It was a population characterised by dreadful material
poverty. The 40,000 inhabitants of the location on the East
Bank of the Rooikrans River lived mainly in corrugated iron
tenement buildings, honey-combs of crudely constructed rooms,
each usually opening on the yard which itself could be dotted
with low keenel-like structures, used as kitchens by day and
as sleeping quarters by night for poorer families. Even
these were lucky in comparison with the alchoholic bush
community, some hundreds of men and women who led a terrible
existence shivering under sacks each night in the surrounding
scrubland. The location itself had an ugly social complexity
arising out of access to property. At its social apex a
small group of owners, often themselves based in the country-
side, supported by rents paid by lodgers,, the rents themselves
Sometimes being high enough to necessitate the lodger sharing
his or her room with sub-tenants. Within each room this
structure would be reflected in sleeping arrangements: the
official lodger perhaps having a bed by the window, his first
The Creation of Mass Movement 26
sub-tenant, probably an age-mate, a blanket on the floor
next to it, the least privileged and least comfortable corner.
For such accommodation people paid on average nearly a pound
a month - approximately 10% of their wages. °
There were indications that conditions were sharply
deteriorating in the late 1940s. East London's population,
to an extent paralleled only by Durban, would have been
sensitive to rural conditions. The Ciskei, East London's
rural hinterland was hit by a terrible series of droughts
from 1945 to 1951. lt}1 They burnt up crops and pasture,
killed large numbers of cattle - for many people their only
source of economic security. For example, in 1949, a quarter
of the cattle population was lost - four years earlier it had
been double the size. For people living in the countryside,
when the nearest water could involve a seven-mile walk, who
had lost their animals and crops (that is if they were not
among the growing number who had lost all access to land),
even the misery of East London's locations would have offered
a ray of hope. Reader, working in the early 1950s, reported
that "relative to the size of the city, the Bantu offer
themselves for work, probably in larger proportions than in
any comparable centre in this Union".102 Resultant low wages,
unemployment, the increasing dependancy of rural dependents each
intensified the horror of location life. In 1945 six out of
every ten African babies born in East London died in their
first year.103 The comparable figure for whites was less
than one in a hundred. In 1953 there were still only thirty
communal lavatories serving a population of forty-odd
thousand.101* According to the official census an extra
10,000 people had been squeezed into the location between 1946
and 1951. The 1951 census was apparently particularly
inaccurate in the case of East London. An independent survey
in 1955 concluded that the location housed over 55,000,10B
141 people to each acre. Unlike Port Elizabeth this was a
population under constant harrassment from irregularly
administered, often savagely effective influx control measures.
In the absence of first-hand oral testimony one has to
use one's imagination to recapture the feelings of rural
people, forced out of the countryside by starvation and land
shortage (or in the case of the squatters and labour tenants
by white farmers), confronted with the glaring discrepancy
between urban white affluence and black poverty. And bringing
with them a world view in which the only whites were' representatives
of a bitterly resented officialdom. It comes as no surprise
to find that the most vigorous political group in the location
was a branch of the Youth League which set itself apart from
national leadership as early as 1952 with the adherence to
an Africanist political philosophy. Gerhart has argued how
the intellectual evolution of Africanism was influenced by
the peasant background of its original exponents. Certainly
its emphasis on racial dichotomy, cultural self-sufficiency
and a heroic past would have found a special resonance in
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in the bitter antecedents of many of East London's proletarians.
The East London Youth League was exceptional in the history z,:.
of political groups in the town in that it brought both "Red"
and "school" people together.106 The Cape Youth League was
unusual in that it developed first in a rural context, round
Herschel (the home of A.P.Mda) thereafter spreading to the
coastal towns. Many of its original nucleus at Fort Hare
had initially been close to the AAC,107 whose leadership looked
to the peasantry for their political base. Accordingly young
student Youth Leaguers in the Cape had begun by organising
literacy classes for farm labourers and peasants.108
The Youth Leaguers would have had less influence if other
political groupings had not been so weak in East London. In
particular there was missing that organic link between trade
unions and politics which distinguished Port Elizabeth.
Congress was split from 1947 as the result of personality
differences into two factions, Congress A and Congress B.
Congress B's dominant figure, V.M. Kwinana, a secondary school
teacher, was despite his collaboration with Communists in
the 1946 Advisory Board Elections109, rather a conservative
figure. He led the opposition at the 194 9 Cape ANC Conference
to the adoption of a boycott strategy and Congress B was to
be at best luke-warm in its attitude to the Defiance Campaign.110
Relations between the Youth League activists, many recent
graduates of nearby Fort Hare University college, and
Kwinana were poor. In 19 50 the latter complained of Youth
League insubordination and ignorance of procedure.111
Communists had succeeded in building a substantial trade
union movement, and in 1944 a disparaging witness allowed
that they had as many as ninety African members in the
location.112 Communist influence was based on the war-time
industrialisation of the African workforce. A local trade
unionist working in 1941 observed that "Africans here are
clamouring to be organised and we are being forced, by their
insistence, to form more unions than we can take care of at
present".113 African trade unionists were responsible for
the rejuvenation of Advisory Board Elections, until the early
1940s the concern of a very limited number of people. Black
East Londoners were obviously receptive to trade union
organisation: even allowing for exaggeration, the 1945 CNETU
figure of 10 unions and 15,000 workers was impressive. 3o
why did local Communists not have the same degree of success
as their comrades in Port Elizabeth in reorienting local
politics? There seem to have been three reasons. First,
strictly enforced curfew laws made political activity in the
township difficult, particularly for a party with a multi-
racial leadership. Secondly, the nature of the location and
its population made it more difficult to build political
support through subsistence issue protest. Unlike Port
Elizabeth, the main landlords were not the municipality, but
absentee Africans, the location being close to the city
centre, transport costs were not a serious problem, and the
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lodger status of many location inhabitants meant that many
saw their homes as being in the countryside. Workplace
organisation was possible and Communist activity centred on
the factory-gate meeting. Community mobilisation was ham-
pered by the incoherency of location society. Thirdly,
Congressites and Communists had to compete with the residual
influence of Clement Kadalie's independent Industrial and
Commercial Union which because of the still charismatic
local presence of its founder, retained a surprising degree
of vitality.
During the war the ICU had enjoyed a revival recapturing
some of the £lan it had lost in 1930. Then an 80% effective
nine day general strike had failed to gain widespread wage
increases and Kadalie himself was accused of misappropriating
funds.11* However, by the 1940s, Kadalie's prestige had
risen, especially amongst the well-to-do educated population
(who had, in any case, dominated local ICU leadership).
Stimulated by the Communist successes and his own deep anti-
pathy to Communists, he tried to compete with them in
organising railway and harbour workers115 and in 1947 200
workers at a textile mill came out on a wildcat strike to
reinstate an ICU shop steward.116 But most of Kadalie's and
his lieutenants' energies were concentrated on location
affairs: the securing of more lavatories, raising local
subscriptions to build a community hall. His popularity
remained high.
Om 1950 the enervation of local Congress politics was
demonstrated in the disputes that broke out between conserva-
tives and left-wing leaders over the question of participation
in the June 26th stay-away. Congress leaders eventually
decided to ignore the strike call despite a well-attended
outdoor meeting voting in favour of participation.117
Established political leaders in East London had, then by
1950 lost much of their authority. Kadalie was dyinq and the .
old Congress discredited. It was this political vacuum which
explains the unusual importance of Youth Leaguers who played
the really decisive role in shaping the campaign in East
London. Of the various local factors determining the high
level of participation of the campaign in East London, the
most important was a peculiar combination of rural and urban
popular preoccupations and the ability of local politicians
to respond to them.
The inter-relationship between town and countryside in
East London helps us to understand the dramatic impact of
the campaign in the Ciskei. Social discontent was especially
widespread in the Ciskei where the effects of land shortage
and landlessness took their most acute form.ue Government
rehabilitation measures had been the object of deep resent-
ment and at times violent opposition. Members of the Ciskei
Bunga in 1952 were to complain of "younger men takinq control
of the districts", of an "ugly spirit of hostility and
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antagonism" manifested in hut burning, assaults on government
employees and the destruction of fences.119 Resistance to
cattle culling dated back to its initial implementation in
1939, Ciskei being the first area in the country where stock
limitation measures were taken.120
Of course, though it could be argued that the Ciskei
was an extreme case, as we.shall see rural dissatisfaction was
pretty general in 1952. But it was only here that Congress
managed to penetrate rural society and obviously the social
relationship between East London and its hinterland was very
important in this. In the Transvaal the ANC was cautious in
its approach to rural organisation, still reluctant to alie-
nate the chiefs. In consequence it recruited on an individual
basis and attempted to retain friendly links with traditional
authorities. This contrasted with the considerably more com-
bative attitude of Eastern Cape leaders :
"Your duty is now to go and spread the message
of freedom to the people in the reserves. They
know what oppression is, what it is to have their
cattle killed. They know what has been done to
their chiefs and they are ready. They have been
ready for years waiting for you. Even your trade
union movement in the towns becomes futile be-
cause of the scab labour they can get any time
in the reserves. Organise the reserves and there
will never be any scab labour."121
The Riots of Port Elizabeth and East London can only be
briefly discussed here. Each arose out of a specific in-
cident involving the police. In Port Elizabeth in the after-
noon of October 18th, a Railway policeman attempted to arrest
two men disembarking at New Brighton whom he had been infor-
med had stolen a tin of paint. The men resisted arrest
gaining sympathy of other passengers on the platform. In the
course of a scuffle, the policeman fired his gun into the
crowd, killing one man and wounding two others. Rumours of
what was happening circulated swiftly : in a few minutes a
large crowd gathered outside the police station and arriving
police reinforcements were stoned. The police fired on the
crowd killing several people. The crowd turned away from
the station and entered the location. A white lorry driver
who was unfortunate enough to be in its' path was killed
and his lorry destroyed. Thereafter in a series of attacks
on white-owned property including a cinema three other whites
were killed. In the course of suppressina the riot, the
police killed seven Africans.
In East London the initial incident which sparked off
subsequent events was more sinister. In reaction to events
in Port Elizabeth all public meetings had been banned but
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local ANC officials managed to obtain permission to hold a
Sunday prayer meeting. The police maintained that on
their arrival at the meeting it was indistinguishable from
a political gathering and that it refused to obey their
orders to disperse. Its organisers disputed this, conten-
ding that the police actually arrived while a hymn was
being sung. Before people had a chance to leave, the
police charged the crowd with bayonets. V7hat seems indis-
putable is that the police who had acceeded to the initial
request for a meeting were extraordinarily well-prepared
for a fight. They arrived heavily armed in three troop
carriers and subsequently their commanding officer admitted
they were "expecting trouble."122
The meeting was thus broken up to the accompaniment
of plenty of shooting, its participants being driven at
gunpoint into the location. In the course of their retreat,
two whites, including a Dominican nun were brutally killed.
The police surrounded the location with a tight cordon and
the sound of gunfire from the location was to trouble nearby
white suburbs until midnight. At least eight people died
as a result of police action. Municipal buildings, a dairy
depot, the Roman Catholic mission school and church were set
alight and gutted.
The evidence is too fragmentary for a satisfactory asses-
sment of the cause of these outbreaks. Obviously the local
impact of the campaign was a factor in explaining the extra-
ordinarily aggressive behaviour of the poiice and the heigh-
tened popular sense of injustice which lay at the heart of
the original incidents. The murder of the unfortunate white
bystanders was the inevitable consequence of the crystalliza-
tion of fear, frustration and anger which the police behaviour
had stimulated. In such a situation normal social inhibitions
and moral restraints would have had little force.In any case,
on both occasions, young teenagers played a disproportionate
role in the disturbances, a large number of whom it was shown
on subsequent investigation came from the most disrupted and
deprived social surroundings. V7ith the worsening overcrowding
and unemployment the size of such a group would have signifi-
cantly expanded in recent years. Social restraints would
have had only a limited significance in such despairing and
hopeless circumstances. White lives and white property were
symbolic targets, chosen spontaneously in a mood of collec-
tive irresponsibility generated by poiice violence. We know
too little about the faces in the crowds to attribute to them
a more rational set of motivations. That they represented
the most socially alienated seems likely given the local
reaction to events : in the case of East London mass migra-
tion to the countryside and political stagnation (though both
these were also the result of repression and fear of the
authorities).
Turning from the Eastern Cape a few brief points must
suffice for an explanation of the limitations of the Defiance
Campaign in Natal.
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In Natal Congress had traditionally enjoyed a strong
following in the smaller rural centres. This was .now
being disrupted because of evictions of peasant communi-
ties established outside the 1936 land delimitation.123
Leadership conflicts had weakened the African National
Congress. Indians had already participated in one passive
resistance campaign which had failed to obtain any conces-
sions from the authorities. But more important than these
was the spirit of caution with which African and Indian
leaders had approached the campaign. In 1949 inter-
communal riots in Durban had brought to the surface a whole
complex of tensions arising out of the conflict-ridden rela-
tionship between Africans and Indians in the sphere of
commerce, transport, housing and jobs, in which Indians were
popularly perceived as exploiters or unfair competitors.
They had resultd in 142 deaths (including 50 Indians and
87 Africans).121* Despite the willingness of some local
Indian and Congress leaders to try and effect communal recon-
ciliation through political collaboration not even the most
optimistic of these pretended that this would be popular.
Consequently in Durban, the Congresses were cautious and
kept a tight rein on defiance actions, eight of the total
of thirteen volunteer batches being arrested at Berea Rail-
way Station in the central industrial district. Organisa-
tional unreadiness, predicted at the 1951 conference by
Natal•s ANC provincial president, Albert Lutuli, helped to
inhibit the spread of the campaign to smaller centres. Nor
was the Natal Indian Congress any better equipped. In 1952
it had only two active branches. 25
The Defiance Campaign's main success was in gaining
for the African National Congress widespread popular support.
By the end of the campaign ANC leaders claimed a following
of 100 000.126 However, membership estimates were to fluc-
tuate wildly in the coming years. Paid up subscriptions on
which such figures were based were hardly an accurate guide
to the movement's degree of influence. In the inactive years
following the campaign, paid up membership dwindled to 29 000.
127
 More striking was the proliferation of Congress branches,
especially in the Cape, from a total of 14 on the eve of the
campaign, at the 1953 provincial conference, 87 branches were
reported to be remitting subscriptions to the provincial
treasurer - many of them in the countryside.12
Congress had also succeeded in jettisoning some of its
more conservative spokesmen : in the rather uncharitable words
of Robert Matji, it had rid itself of "pleading, cowardly
and hamba-kahle (go slow) leaders,"1Z3
The Creation of Mass Movement 32
This is not to say that it had been transformed into "the
revolutionary party of workers, peasants, intellectuals and
petty bourgeoisie" envisaged by the communists in 1950.l30
Passive resistance, though adopted as much for tactical as
ideological reasons,was in itself hardly revolutionary,
especially when clothed in the Gandhist rhetoric of sacri-
fice, martyrdom and individual morality. The conflict
between Njongwe and the left-wing leadership in Port Eliza-
beth is illustrative of the limitations of mainstream
Congress radicalism. In the negotiations with the City
Council (in which an Institute of Race Relations represen-
tative played an important intermediary role 131 there was
still evident a preference for compromise as opposed to
confrontation. Nevertheless, the re-orientation in leader-
ship was very real : Lutuli's election as national presi-
dent at the ANC•s 19 52 annual conference marked this change.
Albert John Lutuli, teacher, methodist lay preacher and
chief of a small reserve in Natal was a man of a very differ-
ent stamp from his urbane, wealthy, and cosmopolitan and
somewhat remote predecessors. A man of great dignity and
courage, he was immediately at home in the world of popular
politics combining eloquence with personal warmth. His
experiences as a local administrator gave him an insight
into the parochial worries and concerns of ordinary people.
His religious faith and training brought to his politics
a principled belief in non-violence and a remarkable opti-
mism of white capacity for a change of heart. For him,
passive resistance, even on a mass scale, held no fears :
"It is not subversive since it does not seek
to overthrow the form and machinery of the
state but only urges for the inclusion of
all sectors of the community in a partnership
in the government of the country on the basis
of equality." 132
For those like Lutuli, who still hoped for.the peaceful
transformation of South Africa into a harmonious multi-racial
society, optimistic conclusions could be drawn from the cam-
paign. Despite crippling restrictions placed on political
activity (legislation followed by a series of banning orders)
supported by the official parliamentary opposition there were
some encouraging demonstrations of support from within the
white community. Especially important in this context, was
one of the final acts of defiance, in Germiston on December
8th, when a group of volunteers broke permit regulations.
Their number included several whites, one of them the son
of a war-time Governor General, Patrick Duncan. Duncan's
participation in the campaign seemed especially important,
for unlike his fellow volunteers, he came neither from a
radical nor even a liberal background. His social origins
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were the nearest to what could be termer1, aristocratic in
a white South African context, his natural conservatism
reinforced by education at Winchester and Oxford and mem-
bership of the colonial service in Basutoland.133 Another
of the Germiston defiers was Manilal Gandhi, son of the
Mahatma, and initially reluctant to identify himself with
an African passive resistance movement. Exponents of a
common society could also be comforted by the absence
of bickering during the campaign between Indian and African
leaders as well as the first significant involvement of
Indians in an African-led campaign. Direct involvement
apart, the campaign itself inspired a regroupment of the
white left - both socialist and liberal, out of which
developed the small Congress of Democrats, officially
allied to the ANC, as well as the Liberal Party. In retros'
pect, hopes inspired by such movements were based on false
premises. At the time they appeared to have great symbolic
importance and significantly contributed to the ideological
formulation of African politics.
3+
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